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IN THE 
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CITIZENS MUTUAL BUILDING ASSOCIATION, INCOR-
PORATED, Defendant-in-Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
· of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, E. Gross and M. Gross, respectfully rep-
resent that they are aggrieved by a final judgment rendered 
against them by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on 
November 2nd, 1935, in an action at law therein pending, 
wherein your petitioners were plaintiffs, and Citizens :Mutual; 
Building Association, Incorporated, was defendant, and in 
which action the jury trying the case found a verdict in favor 
of your petitioners, which verdict the trial court set aside 
and entered a final judgment against your petitioners in favor 
of the defendant . 
. Petitioners will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiffs, 
and the Citizens Mutual Building Association, Incorporated, 
" as the defendant, in accordance with their respective positions 
in the lower court. 
A transc1ipt of the record with the exhibits is herewith :filed, 
to which reference is made. 
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This petition is adopted as the opening brief, a copy of 
which was delivered to counsel for the defendant on the 28th 
day of January, 1936, and oral argument of this petition is re-
quested. · 
FACTS. 
The defendant, at the time of the institution of this snit 
and for a great many years prior thereto, operated, and still 
does operate, a building and loan association in the City of 
Norfolk. .A large portion of its business consisted in weekly 
or monthly deposits made by divers persons as savings, on 
which it paid interest or dividends. At the expiration of a 
definite period fi"Xed by it, the defendant would pay back in 
cash to such depositors the amount of their respective depos-
its, plus the earned dividends or interest thereon. By an ar-
rangement peculiar to building and loan associations, the de-
fendant treated such depositors as fictitious stockholders, for 
it never issued any stock to them, and the depositors were led 
to believe that the moneys paid in to the defendants were sav-
ings wliich they could withdraw at any time. 
The plaintiffs were not familiar with the operation of 
building and loan associations, nor with the operation by the 
defendant of its association or its by-laws. The plaintiffs, 
desiring to save some money, and having been informed that 
building and loan associations paid a higher interest on sav-
ings than did banks, in the early part of January, 1931, the 
plaintiff, }.L Gross, went to the defendant's office for the pur-
pose of starting a savings account with it. He told the agent 
in charge of the defendant's business that they wanted to 
start a savings account, and wanted to ascertain under what 
~onditions they could get back the money which they would 
deposit 'vith it from time to time. The defendant's agent told 
him they could get back whatever money they would' deposit 
with the defendant whenever they wanted it, upon giving 
. thirty days' notice; and that in most cases the defendant re-
turned the money to its depositors without such notice. Rely· 
ing on the promise of the defendant's agent, as aforesaid, the 
plaintiffs began to deposit with the defendant ~5.00 per week 
beginning January 8th, 19·31 (R., p. 9.) On January 7th, 
1932, the plaintiffs ope.ned a similar account with the defend-
ant upon the same terms and conditions, and paid on that ac-
count $5.00 weekly beginning that date.. The plaintiffs made 
such weekly deposits 'vith the defendant up to December 21st, 
1933, at which time they had on deposit with the defendant 
the aggregate sum of approximately $1,343.15. The plaintiffs 
had never seen the by-laws of the defendant, nor were· thos~ 
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by-laws ever explained to them. They were told by the de-
fendant's agent that they could always withdraw their money 
just as they could from a bank, if they gave thirty days' notice 
of their intention so to do (R., p. 10). On December 23rd, 
1933, the plaintiffs notified the defendant, by letter, that they 
wanted to withdraw their money in accordance with their 
agreement with it (R., pp. 11, 12). At the expiration of thirty 
days from the giving· of such notice, the plaintiffs demanded a 
return of their money, but the defendant declined to return 
it (R. p. 10). In the Spring of 1934 the plaintiffs were badly 
hi need of money for their business. It was a case of their 
either obtaining additional money to put into it, or losing their 
business. They again adviaed the defendant of their predica-
ment and the danger of losing their business because of lack 
of funds. At that time they needed approximately $800.00 
to tide them over. An arrangement was thereby made with 
the defendant whereby it advanced $800.00 to the plainti~s. 
But before making such advancement, the defendant required 
the plaintiffs to execute a note so as to make it appear to 
its other depositors that said $800.00 was a loan rather than 
an advancement; but in reality, said $800.00 was a refund of 
a part of the money which the plaintiffs had on deposit with 
the defendant. After the defendant refunded said $800.00 to 
the plaintiffs, there was a balance left in its hands belonging 
to the plaintiffs of approximately $543.15. About fifteen 
months later, the plaintiffs, being in further need of money, 
made another demand on the defendant for a return of .the 
balance due them, which the defendant declined to pay. 
Whereupon, this action was brought. · 
The plaintiffs contended they 'vere entitled to get their 
money back from the defendant because: {1) Under the 
terms of the aforementioned agreement entered into between. 
the plaintiffs and the defendant, and upon which condition 
the plaintiffs deposited their money with the defendant, they 
were entitled to ~et their money back at any time they de-
manded it upon giving thirty days' notice; and (2) Under 
the very terms of the defendant's by-la,vs regulating with-
drawals of 1noney deposited in the manner in which the plain-
tiffs deposited theirs, (R., p. 13), plaintiffs could get back 
their money at any time if there were in the treasury of the 
defendant sufficient money for that purpose. 
On the other hand, the defendant contended that the plain-
tiffs were not entitled to a return of the money because: 
(1) It denied making any agreement with the plaintiffs for a 
return thereof, as was contended by the plaintiffs; and ( 2) 
Plaintiffs were stockholders and not creditors. 
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The defendant admitted that it was its practice to permit 
persons depositing· n1oney with it, as the plaintiffs did in this 
case, to withdraw said money at any time upon giving thirty 
days' notice (R., p. 14). The defendant also admitted that at 
the time the plaintiffs made application for a return of their 
money, it had in its treasury sufficient money from its weekly 
receipts, less expenses, other than past due bonds, to pay 
them back their money (R .. , pp. 12, 14). The defendant fur-
ther admitted that no suits had been broug·ht against it on its 
outstanding past due bonds; that a large number of those 
· outstanding bonds had been converted into obligations pay-
able three years thereafter (R., p .. 14). The defendant also 
admitted at the trial of this case that at the time the plain-
tiffs wanted to withdraw their money, it was solvent; that its 
assets were in excess of its liabilities (R., p. 10). 
The trial court submitted to the jury the question of fact 
as to whether or not the plaintiffs and the defendant entered. 
into an agreement whereby the defendant agreed to return to 
them their money whenever they requested it, upon givin;5 
thirty days' written notice to that effect, as testified to by 
the plaintiffs. That· question was submitted to the jury by 
the sole instruction given in this case without objection (R., 
p. 16). The jury found for the plaintiffs on that issue, thereby 
determining that at the time the plaintiffs made the arrangE:-
ments to deposit their money with the defendant, the latter 
agreed to return that n1oney to the plaintiffs ,whenever they 
requested it, as was testi6ed to by the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT. 
The errors assigned are : 
1. The court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury 
and entering a final judgment for the defendant. 
2. The court erred in permitting the defendant to do-
duct interest on the $800.00 of the plaintiffs' own money which 
it refunded to them. 
We will treat the above assiglim:ents of error in the order 
in which they appear. 
1. The court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and en-
tering judgment for the defendant. 
One of the main issues in this case is whether or not at the 
time the plaintiffs made arrangements with the defendant to 
deposit their money with it on savings, the plaintiffs and the 
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defendant entered into an agreement whereby the latter 
agreed to return to the plaintiffs their money whenever they 
requested it, after thirty days' notice of their desire to with-
draw the same. The plaintiffs testified positively that such an 
agreement 'vas entered into. The defendant, on the other 
hand, denied the making of any such agreement. The jury 
found a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, thereby deciding 
that such an agreement was made at the time. There was 
ample evidence to support the jury's verdi~t. That being so, 
it was the duty of the defendant to refund to the plaintiffs 
their money after it was requested by them so to do. 
There can be no question but that the defendant had. the 
right to make such agreement. In fact, according to the undis-
puted evidence, it was a part of its business to receive money 
from depositors and pay it back upon demand. Furthermore, 
it was deposits of money like the plaintiffs' that enabled the 
defendant to carry on its business of lending ·money. The~e­
fore, the refund of money to its depositors was a part of its 
business. 
The contention of the defendant is that the plaintiffs were 
stockholders, and as such were not entitled to withdraw theil' 
money unless there were sufficient funds in its treasury to 
pay the same. The .evidence shows that the plaintiffs were 
in reality not stockholders ; that no stock was ever issue to 
them, and that there was sufficient money in the defendant's 
·treasury to pay them back their money at the time they de.-
manded it. But if we assume, for the sake of argument, that 
at the time the plaintiffs began depositing their money with 
the defendant, as aforesaid, they became subscribers to the 
defendant's stock, then their subscription would-have been a 
conditional one-that is, under the terms of their agreement 
with the defendant, they could get their money back at any 
time. 
In 14 C. J. 575, it is said: 
''And by the 'veight of authority a corporation, unless pre-
vented by some sp~ial charter or statutory provision, and 
provided the transaction does not operate in fraud of credi-
tors of the corporation .or other stockholders not consenting, 
may make a conditional sale of its shares, or a sale upon an 
agreement by 'Which the purchaser is given an option to resell 
ot· return the stock to the corporation and receive back the 
consideration paid.'' (Italics ours.) 
In Grace Securities ·Corporation v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792.; 
164 S. E. 700, the court ~ays: · 
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"In the absence of charter or statutory prohibition, it is 
well settled, indeed the prevailing doctrine in the United 
States, that corporations may purchase, hold, and sell shares 
of their own stock provided they act in good faith and without 
intent to injure their creditors.'' And the court cites anum-
ber of leading cases in support of that authority. 
And the court further says : 
"We deem it useless to enter into a discussion of the vari-
ous circumstances under which courts have enforced or re-
fused to enforce such a contract. ' 
''The .defendant here, in the stipulation of its counsel, 
states: 'Neither the corporation's charter, nor the general 
law, contains a provision forbidding· it to purchase or deal 
in its own or any other stock or make agreements relative 
thereto.' 
"We then have the defendant admitting that there is no 
provision in its charter or the general law forbidding it 
to make the contract, and positively asserting that the cor-
poration had such power. How then can it consistently urge 
that this contract of the corporation is ultra vires1 We are 
confined in this as in all other cases to the record as made 
in the trial court.' ' 
And the court further says: 
"If the contract of repurchase is valid, the plaintiff has 
under it a right to deliver her stock to the defendant andre-
ceive from it the price agreed upon. The same result fol-
lows if the contract to repurchase is invalid. If we concede 
that the contract is ultra vires (and for the purposes of 
this case and for the salre of the argument we are willing 
to concede this), it is void and might as well have never 
been written, for the net result of the transaction is that 
the defendant has the plaintiff's money, has given no con-
sideration therefor, and holds it illegally." 
The court then quoting from 4 Fletcher's Cyc. Corp., 
says: 
''According to the weight of authority, an agreement by 
which a purchaser may, at his option, at the end of a certain 
time, return the stock and receive back the price, or whereby 
the cmnpany agrees to repttrchase it at an agreed pr,i.cc affe1: 
a certa'tn time, is in the nature of a conditional sale with 
an option to the purchaser to resci~d, and is valid, provided 
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there is a sufficient consideration which supports it, and 
there is no fraudulent invasion of the rights . of creditors 
or of the other stockholders.'' (Italics ours.) 
And again the court says : 
''As we have already indicated, the record does not dis-
close that there has been any invasion of the rights of credi-
tors or stockholders in this case.'' 
In the case at bar, the undisputed evidence is that at the 
time when the plaintiffs demanded a return of their money, 
and even up to the time of the trial of this case, the defend-
ant was a going concern, and was solvent; that it was a part 
of its business to refund to its depositors the amounts de-
posited by them after the expiration of a definite period fixed 
by it, regardless of the amount of its indebtedness; that it 
was its practice at all times to refund to its depositors like 
the plaintiffs the amounts deposited with it; that none of the 
defendant's creditors had brought any actions against it; that 
there was no int~rvention by any of its creditors; that no 
claims of credifors were involved in this action; that a large 
number of its outstanding oblig·ations were converted into 
obligations payable three years later; that at the time the 
plaintiffs requested a return of their money, the defendant 
had in its treasury sufficient money, after deducting its ex-
penses, to pay the plaintiffs' claim in full; and that pursuant 
to Section 18 of the defendant's by-laws, a depositor whose 
stock is not pledged under a mortgage loan may withdraw all 
or any number of shares before maturity (R., p. 13). 
The case of Grace Securi"ties Corporation v. Roberts, supra, 
is practically on all fours with the case at bar even if we con-
ceded, for the sake of argument, that the plaintiffs were stock~ 
holders. In the instant case, as in the case of Grace Securi-
ties Corporation v. Roberts, supra, the defendant had the 
right to enter into a contract .to repurchase the plaintiffs' 
stock; that if the deposit by the plaintiffs of their money with 
the defendant could be considered a subscription to buy stock, 
then it was a conditional subscription; that the defendant 
agreed to return the plaintiffs' money (which would be equiv-
alent to agreeing to repurchase the plaintiffs' stock, if stock 
had been issued to them) ; that ''the record does not dis-
close that there has been any invasion of the rights of credi-
tors or stockholders in this case''. 
We might also add here that the defendant's agreement to 
return the plaintiffs' money in this case could not affect the 
rights of creditors or stockholders, because the defendant's 
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creditors, which consisted of its bondholders, undoubtedly 
knew the workings of building· and loan associations, and also 
knew that persons depositing money on savings could get 
their money back whenever they wanted it upon giving the 
required notice. Certainly, the stockholders also knew that. 
We further contend that by the very terms of the defend-
ant-'s by-laws, in the absence of any agreement for a return 
of their money, the plaintiffs were entitled to get their money 
back. 
· The by-laws were prepa.red by the defendant for the conduct 
of its business, and under the well established rule of law, 
if there is any ambiguity therein, it should be resolved against 
it. However, Section 18 of its by-la,vs, which is its only by-
law pertinent to the issue involved in this case, is not only 
free from doubt, but expressly provides the method by which 
a depositor can get his money back. An examination of Sec-
tion 18 of the defendal)t 's by-laws (R., p. 13) shows that'' all 
installment shares'' (savings like the plaintiffs' are desig-
nated by the defendant as installment shares) ''are sold on 
the theory that every share is to continue in full force until 
maturity", which means that the party depositing the money 
is to make those payments until a ce~tain time fixed by the 
association. ''However, any member whose stock is not 
pledged under a mortgage loan rnay withdraw all or any num-
ber of shares before maturity", meaning that depositors 
like the plaintiffs could withdraw whatever money they had 
on deposit at any time before the time fixed by the defend-
ant when it would pay back the amount deposited with it, plus 
the interest or dividends thereon. The only restriction upon 
those withdrawals is that if at any time the applications for 
such withdrawals shall be in excess of the amount in the de-
fendant's treasury from the weekly receipts, less expenses, 
then "such applications shall be filed in the order in which 
they are received and paid in the same order as fast as the 
regular receipts of the association will pay them." 
It will readily be seen that by the very terms of Section 
18 of the defendant's by -laws, sttpra, the plaintiffs were en-
titled to get their money back, because the uncontradicted 
evidence is that at the time they filed their application, there 
was sufficient money in the treasury, less expenses, to pay their 
claim in full. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that by reason of the 
aforementioned agreement entered into between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant at the thne the former began saving their 
money with it, and by virtue of the defendant's by-laws, the 
plaintiffs are entitled to their money. 
In the trial court, the defendant relied on the building and 
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loan association act adopted by the Legislature of this State 
in 1932 in support of its contention. If there is anything 
in that act which would nullify the effect of the aforemen-
tioned agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and the 
defendant, it would be unconstitutionaL However, as we will 
hereinafter show, that act does not conflict with the plaintiffs' 
contention. That act was pas·sed for the benefit of building 
and loan associations. An association is not compelled to 
accept those benefits. It is discretionary with it w)lether it 
.will operate strictly within the provisions of the act. 
The act above referred to is Section 4167 of the 1932 sup-
plement to the Virginia Code of 1930. Sub-section a of the 
aforementioned act, in defining the meaning of building and 
loan associations, refers to an association engaged in busi-
ness 1 ''/or the accu·mulation of savings to be returned to me'ln-
bers or :~hareholders who do not obtain adva·nces for such 
purposes, when the savings of s~tch members amount to a cer-
tain sum per share". (Italics ours.) That section au-
thorizes building and loan associations to accept and pay back 
deposits of the type involved in this case. Every person do-
ing· business with a building and loan association, therefore, 
knew that the associations were authorized to return and 
would return to their members the deposits made by them. 
Sub-section 2 of Section 4167, s·upra, expressly provides 
that the act shall not ''affect the legality of any investment 
heretofore made or transaction heretofore had, under au-
thority of any provisions of law in force when such invest-
ments were made or transactions had". Thus, if it can be con-
tended that the aforementioned act of the Legislature has 
changed the la'v regulating· the transactions of building and 
loan association$, then, under the express provisions of that 
statute, it would not affect the transaction entered into be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant long before the said 
statute was enacted. 
Sub-section 6 of .Section 4167, S'ltpra, expressly ~provides 
that ''every association may levy, assess and collect from 
its shareholders, dues or payments upon eve:ry share of its 
stock, the amount, time and manner of payment of the same 
to be fixed by the by-laws, and the said stock may be paid off· 
and retired as the by-laws shall direct". (Italics ours.) By 
the very provisions of sub-section 6 of Section 4167, sutJra, 
the defendant had the right to determine by its by-laws the 
amount, time and manner of refunding payments to its de-
positors. The defendant has determined the time and man-
ner of th9se payments to its shareholders by Section 18 of its 
by-laws, s~pra. 
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Sub.:.section 10. of Section 4167, supra, authorizes every 
building and loan association doing business in this State to 
adopt by-laws for the government and management of its 
business. Therefore, the defendant had the right to adopt 
Section 18 of the by-laws heretofore set out. 
Sub-section 13 of Section 4167, sup1·a, provides that ''every 
building and loan association shall have the right to establish 
rules governing withdrawals of shares of every kind, or the 
payment. of matured shares, and may, from time to time; fix 
the period of notice required to be given for withdrawals, and 
in emergency the notice period n1ay be extended by the di-
rectors. The relation existing between the _association and 
its shareholders, as to all shares subscribed to, shall except 
as othen.vise het·ein 1Jrovided be such as usually exists be-
tween a corporation and shareholders, etc.'' (Italics ours.) 
Said section expressly authorizes building and loan associa-
tions to permit withdrawals of deposits. 
Sub-section 23 of Section 4167, supra, provides the method 
by which associations are liquidated, in which event the credi-
tors are to be paid before the shareholders. 
We have referred to Section 4167 of the 1932 supplement 
, to the Virginia Code of 1930, sttpra, and have quoted there-
from to show that the present law regulating building and 
loan associations in this State would not prevent the defend-
ant from entering into a contract with the plaintiffs to re-
fund their money, as aforesaid, nor would it affect Section 18 
of the defendant's by-laws. And we repeat that the present 
law expressly provides that it shall not be construed so as to 
affect transactions in existence when it was enacted. So if 
the defendant attempts to rely on the aforementioned sec-
tion in support of its contention, our answer to such con-
tention is that it is expressly contrary to the provisions con-
tained in sub-section 2 of said section, as well as the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the State of Virginia, and of the 
United States. · 
(2) The court erred in permitting the defendant to charge 
interest on the $800.00 which it refunded to the plaintiffs, and 
there by permitted the jury to deduct said interest, which 
amounts to $72.00, from the amount to which the plaintiffs 
are entitled. 
The evidence shows conclusively that the $800.00 which the 
defendant paid over to the plaintiffs was their own money. 
The defendant merely went through the formality of mak-
ing it app2ar as a loan, but in reality it was a refund of a 
part of the plaintiffs' money Certainly, the defendant would 
not be entitled to charge the plaintiffs interest on said amount 
under those circumstances. 
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For the reasons above set forth, the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, as your petitioners are advised and now 
charge, erred to the prejudice of your petitioners in its rul-
ing and judgment aforesaid; and for the errors so made, 
and other errors apparent upon the face of the record, the 
judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk setting 
aside the verdict of the jury in favor of your petitioners 
should be reviewed and reversed. And your petitioners ac-
cordingly pray that this Honorable Court will g·rant unto 
them a writ of error to the judgment aforesaid, and will re-
view and reverse said judgment, and either enter a final judg-
ment in favor of your petitioners for the amount of the ver-
dict of the jury, plus the amount which the defendant was 
permitted to deduct as interest, or remand the case to the 
said Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, for further pro-
ceedings, according to law, as this Court shall deem advis-
able. 
And as in duty bound, you petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
E. GROSS and M. GROSS, 
By HERlVIAN A. SACI{S, 
Their Counsel. 
I, Herman A. Sacks, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opin-
ion, the judg·ment complained of in the foregoing petition 
should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. 
HERMAN A. SACKS~ 
Received copy of this petition this 28th day of January, 
1936. 
E. M. BAUM, JR., 
Atty. for Citizens Mutual Bldg. Asso., Inc. 
Received January 29, 1936. 
J\L B. WATTS, Clerk. . 
March 13, 1936. Writ of error awarded by the Court. 
Bond $300.00. 
M. B. W. 
..: 




Pleas before the Circuit ·Gourt of the City of Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on the 16th day of December, in 
the ye!tr of our Lord, nineteen hundred and thirty-five. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court aforesaid, on the 8th day of July, in the year, 1935, 
came the· plaintiffs, E. Gross and M. Gross, and docketed their 
Notice of Motion for judgment against the defendant, Citizens 
Mutual Building Association, Incorporated, in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: · · 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
E. Gross and M. Gross, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Citizens Mutual Building Association, Incorporated, Defend~ 
ant. 
To Citizens Mutual Building Association, Incorporated: 
Notice is hereby given you that on the 8th day of July, 
1935, at ten o'clock A. M., or so soon thereafter as the un-
dersigned can be heard, the undersigned will make a motion 
before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Yir-
page 2 ~ ginia, at the Courthouse thereof, in said City, for 
a judgment against you for the sum of Five Hun-
dred Forty-three Dollars and Fifteen Cents ($543.15), with 
interest thereon from July 1st, 1933, until paid, which amount 
is due the undersigned from you for money which .they 
have saved and deposited with you upon your express promise 
to pay·the same to them whenever you would be requested so 
to do; that although you were requested to p~y over said 
money to the undersigned, you refused, and still doth refuse, . 
to pay over the ·same to thenl. 
Wherefore, the undersigned will pray for a judgment 
against you for the sum first above mentioned, with inter~st 
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thereon, as aforesaid, at the time and place first above set . 
out. 
E. GROSS and M. GROSS, 
By HERMAN A. SACKS, Their Attorney. 
HERl\tiAN A·. SAOKS, p. q. 
Service of this notice is accepted this 2nd day of July, 
1935, and we .hereby waive the fifteen days' notice required 
by law and consent to the docketing of said notice on the 
return date thereof. 
CITIZENS MUTUAL BUILDING ASSOCIATION, 
INCORPORATED, 
By E. M. BAUM, JR., Its Attorney. 
And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 8th day of July, in the year, 1935: 
Upon motion of the plaintiffs, by counsel, it is ordered that· 
this notice of motion be docketed; and thereupon 
page 3 } came the parties, by counsel and the said de-
fendant, with leave of court filed its special plea 
herein; and the further hearing is continued. 
The foilowing is the Special Plea filed herein by leave of 
the foregoing order : 
SPECIAL PLEA. 
The Defendant, by its attorneys, comes and says that the 
Plaintiffs ought not to have or maintain any action against it, 
be~ause the Defendant is a building and loan association or-
g·anized and existing under the laws of the State of Virginia, 
and the only money or monies ever deposited with the De-
fendant by the Plaintiffs was deposited by them as payments 
on installment stock subscribed for and purchased by the 
Plaintiffs in the Defendant, and the Plaintiffs are, therefore, 
shareholders of the Defendant, ·and as such are not entitled 
to withdraw their stock and receive payment of the amount 
payable on the said stock unless there are sufficient funds in 
the treasury of the Defendant applicable to the payment of 
the same; and that at the time of the alleged demand by the 
Plaintiffs on the Defendant to pay any amounts deposited by 
them with the Defendant, and at the time the Plaintiffs in-
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stituted this suit, and at all times after said events, there were· 
not in the treasury of the Defendant sufficient funds applicable 
to the payment of their claims with which to pay the same 
.or any part thereof; and had there been sufficient funds at 
any of the said times, that by the reason of the by-
page 4 ~ laws of said Association, the Plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to withdraw any funds so deposited until 
it was ascertained what losses, if any, the Defendant has 
sustained in the operation of its business, nor could it have 
been ascertained at any of the events heretofore ·mentioned 
what the losses were, if any. 
And this the Defendant is ready to verify. 
MELVIN E. CRUSER & 
E. M. BA U~f, JR. p. d. 
And at an,other day, to-,vit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 5th day of August, in the year, ~935 : 
This day came again as well the plaintiffs, by their attor-
ney, Herman A. Sacks, as the defendant, by its attorneys, E. 
M. Baum, Jr., and Melvin E. Cruser, and thereupon said 
plaintiffs, with leave of Court filed herein their Replication to 
said defendant's Special Plea heretofore filed herein; and 
thereupon said defendant pleaded the general issue to which 
said plaintiff replied generally and issue is joined; and 
thereupon came a jury, to-wit: R. H. May, Jr., P. E. Yeat-
man, A. L. Belfield, P. N. Gibbings, A. L. Jones, C. L. Barry 
and T. H. McVay, who were sworn to well and truly try the 
issue joined, and having fully heard said plaintiffs' evidence 
said defendant moved the court to strike out said plaintiffs' 
evidence, which motion having b~en fully heard and maturely 
considered by the Court is overruled, to which action, said de-
fendant excepted; ancl thereupon the jury having fully heard 
the evidence and argument of counsel returned their verdict 
in the following words and figures, to-wit: "We, 
page 5 ~ the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $471.15 
with interest from Jan. 1, 1934". And thereupon 
said defendant, by its attorneys, moved the Court to set aside 
the ve1·dict of the jury and grant it a new trial on the grounds 
that the same is contrary to. the law and evidence; and the 
further hearing of which motion is continued.· 
The following is the replication to Special Plea filed by 
leave of the foregoing order: 
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REPLICATION TO SPECIAL PLEA. 
The said plaintiffs, by their attorney, in answer to the 
special plea filed by the defendants in the above entitled cause, 
come and say: 
That at the time they deposited the money with the de-
fendant, as alleg·ed in the notice of motion for judgment here-
tofore filed, the said defendant represented to them that the 
said plaintiffs could get back from the defendant whatever 
money they had on deposit with it at any time they so re-
quested it; that they deposited said money with the defend-
ant because of the representation and promise of the de-
fendant that it would repay said money to the plaintiffs at 
any time it would be requested by them so to do; that had 
the defendant not made such representation and promise 
to the plaintiffs, they would not have deposited said money 
with it. 
And the said plaintiffs further say that they are not bound 
by any by-law or provision of the said defendant relative to 
the return of their said money, because said money 
page 6 ~ was deposited by them with the defendant upon the 
express condition that the defendant would return 
it to them whenever it was requested by the plaintiffs so to 
do, as aforesaid. 
· By reason 'vhereof, and in pursuance of the aforementioned 
agreement, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the de-
fendant the amount the latter has in its possession belong-
ing to them, as alleged in the notice of motion for judgment 
filed in this action. And this the said plaintiffs are ready 
to verify. 
. HERMAN A. SAOKS, p. q. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 2nd day of November, in the year, 1935 : 
This day came again as well the plaintiffs, by their attor-
ney, Herman A. Sacks, as the· defendant, by its attorneys, E. 
M. Baum, Jr., and Melvin E. Cruser. And thereupon the 
motion to set aside the verdict of the jury having been fully 
heard and maturely considered by the Court, and the Court 
being of the opinion that this action of the plaintiffs against 
the defendant has been prematurely brought, doth hereby 
sustain the aforementioned motion and doth hereby set aside 
the verdict of the jury. And, thereupon, the Court now pro-
ceeding to enter such judgment as to it might seem right and 
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proper, it is considered by the Court that the said plaintiffs 
take nothing by their suit herein, and that the said defendant 
go hence without day and recover of the said plaintiffs its 
costs about its defense in this behalf expended, with-
page ·7 ~ out prejudice, however, to the plaintiffs' right to 
bring any future action to recover the sum of money 
involved in this action as the said plaintiffs may be advised· to 
take; and that· the said plaintiffs are not barred by this or-
der from bringing any future action to recover from the de-
fendant said sum of money; to all of which the said plaintiffs, 
by their attorney, duly excepted. 
And now, at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 16th day of December, in the year, 1935, the 
day and year first hereinabove written: 
This day came again the plaintiffs, E. Gross and M. Gross, 
by their attorney, and the defendant, Citizens Mutual Build-
ing Association, Incorporated, by its attorneys, and the said 
· plaintiffs, in pursuance of leave heretofore given them and 
within th~ time allowed by law therefor, tendered their four 
certificates of exceptions, num.bered 1, 2, 3 and 4, after it 
duly appeared that prope_r written notice pursuant to law of 
the time and place of the presenting of said certificates of 
exceptions had been given to the defendant, who was present 
by counsel when such certificates were presented and filed, 
which certificates of exceptions were received, signed and 
sealed by the Court and ordered to be made a part of the 
record in this case. 
page 8 ~ The following are the Certificates· of Exception 
numbm:s 1, 2, 3 and 4, filed herein and made a part 
of the record by leave of the foreg·oing order: 
page 9 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
. . 
The follo~~ng evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs and the 
defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all the 
evidence that was introduced in the trial of this cause: 
'' M. GROSS testified on behalf of the plaintiffs as follows: 
My name isM. Gross. I am a partner with my brother, E. 
Gross. We wanted to open a savings account. We preferred 
to save our money in a building· and lo~n association rather 
than in a bank because a building and loan association woula 
pay more interest. We were not familiar with the opera-
. tion of buildJng and loan associations. In the early part of 
J 
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January, 1931, I went to the office of the defendant for the 
purpose of starting a savings account with ~t. I told the gen-
tleman in charge, Mr. L. M. Curdts, that we wanted to start" 
a savings account with the defendant and asked Mr. Curdts 
under what conditions w_e could get baek the money which we 
would deposit from time to time. Mr. Curdts told me we could 
get back whatever money we had on deposit with the defend-
ant whenever we wanted it back, upon the giving of thirty 
, days' notice, and Mr. Curdts also stated that in most cases 
the association refunded money to depositors without such 
notice. Relying on Mr. Curdts' promise, we opened a sav-
ings account with the defendant on January 8th, 1931, by pay-
ing· $5.00 on that date, and $5.00 each and every week there-
after until December 21st, 1933; The defendant gave us a 
book in which it made entries of our deposits. On J anua:ry 
7th, 1932, we opened another savings account with 
page 10 ~ the defendant upon the same terms and conditions. 
We deposited with the defendant on said last men-
tioned date the sum of $5.00 on our new account, and paid the 
defendant $5.0Q each and every week thereafter on said new 
account until December 21st, 1933. On December 21st, 1933, 
we had on deposit with the defendant the aggregate sum of 
$1,343.15, exclusive of interest. We were not familiar with 
the by-laws of the defendant. We had· never seen said by-
. laws, nor were the by-laws explained to us. We were told by 
Mr. L. M. Curdts that we could always withdraw our money 
from the defendant just as we could from a bank if we gave 
the defendant thirty days' notiee that we wanted our money. 
On the 23rd day of December, 1933, we notified the defend-
ant of our desire to withdraw the money we had on deposit 
with it. We waited until the expiration of thirty days from 
the giving of such notice, and after that time we made sev-
eral demands on the defendant for the return of our money, 
but it declined to return it. Mr. W. T. Curdts, Secretary, 
advised us to go to a bank and borrow money, and assign to 
the lending bank as collateral the amount which we had on 
deposit with the defendant. The bank refused to make a loan 
upon such security, and we advised the defendant thereof. 
We were badly in need of money in the Spring of 1934. It 
was a case of our either getting money to tide over our 
business or losing it. We took the matter up again with the 
defendant and explained to it the predicament we were in. 
Our business was being jeopardized because of our inability to 
raise money. We needed then approximately $800.00 to save 
our business. The defendant, realizing our finan-
page 11 ~ cial condition, and in order to prevent our losing 
our business, agreed to advance us $800.00. The 
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defendant~stated that it would designate the aforementioned 
return of $800.00 as a loan rather than a return so that other 
of its depositors ·would not feel that we were being pre-
ferred over them. Thereupon a letter dated May 20th, 1934, 
w:as signed by me at the request of the defendant, which let-
ter was· introduced in evidence and marked Exhibit '' C ,., . 
Since we were in need of $800.00 badly and could get it from 
the defendant without much difficulty if we signed the l~t­
ter of May 20th, 1934, I signed it. Upon the signing of said 
letter and the execution of a note, the defendant advanced us 
$800.00 on ~{ay 28th, 1934, thereby leaving a balance due us 
of $543.15. About fifteen months later, we were in need of 
additional money for our business and we made a furtP.er. 
demand on the defendant for the return to us of the bal-· 
ance 've had on deposit with it, but the defendant declined to. 
pay said balance. Whereupon, we brought this action for the 
recovery of said balance. ' ' 
The plaintiffs introduced in evidence duplicate books of 
the defendant numbered 2789 and 2982, respectively, which 
were given to them by the defendant, and wherein entries 
of deposits made by the plaintiffs were recorded. 
The aforementioned Ex~ibit '' C '' reads as follows:. 
''Citizens Mutual Building Ass 'n, Inc., 
Norfolk, Va. 
Gentlemen: 
I hereby make application to your association for an ad-
, vancement of $800.00 on account of my having 
page 12 ~ opened a shop which entailed an ·additional outlay 
· of credit and money, which shop I opened ·predi-
cated upon my ability to receive from your association said 
amount, for which I made application prior to the time that 
you asked for an extension of your bondholders and creditors, 
and which if I do not receive will seriously embarrass me 
financially and may impair my credit to the point that I am 
fearful I might have to close my business and thereby put 
out of employment fifteen or more people·. 
If this request is g-ranted, I assure you I shall be glad to 
take my turn with the rest of the running stockholders, and 
will expect no further advancement from you except in such 
manner as to fare the same as the rest of your running stock-
holders. · 
Yours very truly, 
(si.gned) MICHAEL GROSS" 
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"W. T. CURDTS, Jr., testified on behalf of the defendant 
as follows: My name is W. T. Curdts, Jr. I am Secretary of 
the defendant. At the time of the trial and at the time the 
plaintiffs wanted to withdraw the money they had on deposit 
~ith the defendant, the latter was solvent. Its assets were 
in excess of its liabilities. At the time the plaintiffs made ap-
plication for a return of their money, the defendant had in its 
treasury sufficient money from its weekly receipts, less ex-
penses, other than past due bonds, to pay the plaintiffs back 
their money. At the time the plaintiffs made application for 
a return of their money, there were outstanding past due 
bonds of the defendant aggregating $806,100.00, but no ac-
tion had been instituted against the defendant on said bonds, 
nor were any actions pending against it on any of its past 
due bonds up to the time of the trial of this case. A large 
number of the outstanding bonds of the defendant had been 
converted into obligaltions of the said defendant pay~ble 
three years thereafter. The defendant refused to 
page 13 } return to the plaintiffs the money which they had 
deposited with it for the reason that the defendant 
regarded the plaintiffs as stockholders. The defendant re-
lied on Section 18 of its by-laws, which was in force from the 
time the plaintiffs opened the accounts with it up to the 
time of the trial. '' 
Said Section 18 of the by-laws was introduced in evidence 
and reads as follows. 
''All installment shares are sold on the theory that every 
share is to continue in full force until maturity; however, 
any member whose stock is not pledged under a mortgage 
loan may withdraw all or any number of shares before ma-
turity. Shares so withdra,vn and cancelled shall not be en-
titled to any part of the earnings or dividends previously de- · 
clared, regardless of whether or not .dividends- have been en-
tered on member's pass-book. Such withdrawing members, 
however, who have made payments continuously for two 
years, or more shall be entitled· to receive all payments made 
as dues, plus interest at a rate per annum to be determined 
by the Board of Directors for the average time . said dues 
have been on deposit, less any penalties due the association 
up to the time withdrawal notice is filed and any share of 
known losses. Provided, however, that should there be in-
sufficient money in the Treasury and the applications for 
withdrawals exceed the weekly receipts less expenses, such 
applications shall be filed in the order in wh~ch they are re-
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ceived, and paid in the same order as fast as the regular re-
ceipts of the Association will pay them. 
"Ninety days notice in writing prior to a dividend date 
may be required before paid up stock may be withdrawn; 
and sl}.o.u~d the Board of Directors deem it advisable, with-
dr~wals or payments for paid up stock may be permitted only 
to the extent of fifty per cent of the receipts of 
pag·e 14 ~ the association, after all interest, curtail and over-
head expense requirements are met. The right to 
dividends on stock shall cease at maturity of notice of with-
drawal.'' · 
Mr. Curdts further testified as follows: ''The transaC-
tion of the plaintiffs with the defendant amounted to a sub-
scription on their part to purchase stock of the defendant, 
which was classed as running stock. No stock was actually 
issued to the plaintiffs. Every person who purchased such 
stock from the defendant was advised that when said stock · 
matured, the purchaser thereof could either receive paid up 
stock or cash. The practice of the defendant was to permit 
persons subscribing to such running stock to withdraw their 
money at any time before maturity upon giving thirty days' 
notice. The reason the defendant declined to refund the 
money to the plaintiffs 'vas that the outstanding past due 
bonds of the defendant exceeded the amount it had in its 
· treasury. At the time of the advancement of the $800.00 to 
the plaintiffs, the latter executed a note for said $800.00 to 
draw intereet with the stock of the plaintiffs as collateral. 
At the time of the filing of the application by the plaint1ffs for 
withdrawal of their money, there were already on file with 
the defendant twelve applications for withdrawal, and that 
none of said withdrawals had been permitted .. The defend-
ant had in its treasury sufficient funds from its weekly re-
ceipts, after deducting its expenses, except the bonds afore-
said for the payment of the amounts claimed by said twelve 
applicants and that claimed by the plaintiffs. The advance-
ment of the $800.00 was a loan and not a return of the money 
deposited by the plaintiffs. 1\1r. L. M. Crudts was 
page 15 ~ not an officer of the defendant, but its teller. The 
amount on hand in the treasury of the defendants 
from its regular weekly receipts on December 23rd, 1933, 
was $4,877.51, and the total amount of running stock sought 
to be withdrawn by the stockholders, who had given notice 
of their desire to withdraw their money prior to the plaintiffs, 
was $3,892.25, but the said withdrawals were not permitted. 
The plaintiffs owed the defendant at the time of the trial of 
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this case interest on the aforementioned $800.00 amounting 
to $72.00, which should be deducted from the plaintiffs' 
claim.'' 
''L. M. CURDTS testified -on behalf of the defendant as 
follows : ~Iy name is L. M. Curdts. I. am teller for the de-
fendant. I open accounts for it, an~ receive money paid to 
it from its divers depositors. I have authority so to do. I 
opened the accounts between the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant. I did not tell the plaintiffs they could get their money 
back whenever they wanted it. The association for years 
had permitted withdra.wals of money paid for· running stock 
upon the request of the respective depositors.'' 
Teste: This 16th day of ·December 1935. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk. 
page 16 ~ CERTIFICATE OF· EXCEPTION NO . .2. 
This is to certify that.the following instruction was the only 
instruction granted at the trial of this case: 
''The sole question for the jury to decide is whether or not 
when Mr. Gross had his transaction with· the Building Asso-
ciation, he was promised by the Teller that he would be per-
mitted to withdraw his money at any time, regardless of the 
provisions of the by-laws. 
''The burden is on Mr. Gross to prove his contention by a 
preponderance of the eviden~e.'' 
Teste : This 16th day of December, 1935. 
RICHARD MciLWAINE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk. 
page 17 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
This is to certify that after the evidence was in, and the 
instruction mentioned in Certificate of Exception No. 2 had. 
been given, the jury, after having heard the argument of coun-
sel, returned a verdict in the words as follows : · 
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''We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $471.15, 
with interest from January 1st, 1934. Robert H. 1\{ay, Jr., 
Foreman.'' 
Whereupon, the defendant moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict on the ground that it was contrary to law and the 
evidence, and the defendant further moved the ~Court to en-
ter final judgment for it, which motion was sustained and the 
Court thereupon set aside the verdict of the jury and entered 
a final judgment in favor of the defendant, to which action of 
the Court in so setting aside the verdict of the jury, the 
plaintiffs excepted on the ground that there was ample evi-
dence to support the verdict of the jury. 
Teste: This 16th day of December, 1935. 
RIOHARD lVIciLWAINE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk. 
page 18 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
This is to certify that the plaintiffs objected to the charge 
by the defendant of interest on the $800.00 which it advanced 
to them, for the reason that the plaintiffs contended that no 
interest was due on said $800.00 since it was a refund to 
them of their own money. 
Teste: This 16th day of December, 1935. 
RlCHARD MciLWAINE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk. 
page 19 ~ The following is the Stipulation between coun-
sel filed herein : 
It is agreed between the counsel representing the plain-
tiffs and the defendant, respectively, that the two books is-
sued by the defendant to the plaintiffs representing the money 
paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant and the defendants 
financial statement and plaintiff's letter to defendant need not 
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be copied in the record and that the said exhibits may be 
transmitted to the Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia as 
the' original exhibits. 
HERMAN .A. SACKS, 
.Attorney for the Plaintiffs. 
MELVIN E. CRUSER, 
Attorneys for the Citizens Mutual Building. 
Association, Incorpo~ated. 
page 20 ~ The following is the Appeal notice filed herein 
on the 16th day of December, 1935 : 
To Citizens ~Iutual Building .Association, Incorporated: 
Notice is hereby given you that on the 14th day of Decem-
ber, 19:-15, at 9:30 o'clock A. J\ti., or so soon thereafter as the 
undersigned can he heard, the undersigned will present their 
certificates of exceptions to the Honorable Richard Mcllwaine, 
who in this case acted as Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, at his office, in their action against 
you recently pending in said Court. 
And also take notice that on the same day, at noon, the 
undersigned shall apply to the Clerk of said Court for a trans-
cript of the record in said case in order to apply for a writ of 
• error. 
. E. GROSS and M. GROSS, 
By HERMAN A. SACKS, 
Their Counsel. 
Service accepted this 9th day of December, 1935. 
MEL"V1N E. CRUSE·R & 
E. M. BAUl\f, JR., 
By ~IELVIN E. CRUSER. 
Attorneys for Citizens Mutual Building Association, Inc. 
page 21 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Nor-
folk, on the 28th day of December, in the year, 1935 .. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, do certify that the foregoing is a true trans-
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cript of the record in the suit of E. Gross and M. Gross, plain-
tiffs, against Citizens Mutual Building ·Association, Incorpo-
rated, defendant, lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the defendant had received due no-
tice thereof, and of the intention of the plaintiffs to apply to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of er-
ror and supersedeas to the j~~gment therein. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By 1\URGUERITE R. GRONER, D. C. 
Fee for Transcript $14.00. 
l~ .. Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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